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Managing the latrogenic Risks of
Risk Management*
Jonathan Baert Wiener**
Introduction
Risk management aims to protect, but many's the slip betwixt help
and health. Medical care is meant to make people well, but it can harm
as it heals. This is the pervasive problem of "iatrogenic" (care-induced)
and "nosocomial" (hospital-induced) injury.1 "Most treatments have
side effects as well as benefits." 2 "Medical care is an inherently risky
enterprise. " 3 "[M]edical progress has provided physicians with an
arsenal of double-edged swords." 4 The modern medical community
appears, more or less, to accept iatrogenesis as a fact of life, and to work
5
diligently to manage the risks of its own risk management measures.
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When the state plays the role of physician-king and seeks to protect
social and ecological health, it confronts the same challenge. Risk
regulation by the state is inherently risky. Interventions may reduce
"target risks" but may also increase "countervailing risks." 6 Examples
are ubiquitous. To cite a few: Requiring airbags in cars may save adults

but kill children and small adults. 7 Using hot water to clean up oil
spills may cause collateral damage to marine organisms. 8 Protecting
public health by cleaning up Superfund sites, or removing asbestos from
buildings, may put workers at risk of exposure and occupational
injury. 9 Banning one hazardous substance (such as a pesticide or food
additive) may induce the use of hazardous substitutes. 10 Regulating a
5 Assertions of iatrogenic causes of illness have often encountered hostility from the
medical profession, see infra note 25 and notes 89-93 and accompanying text. But
empirical documentation has gradually engendered what appears to be a more open
and pragmatic perspective. A recent example is the exhortation to physicians that
"[iatrogenic events] in hospitalized patients are countable, dangerous, and evaluable
events, not just a collection of unhappy accidents that strike, like cosmic rays, in ways
that we cannot predict or understand." Jerry Avorn, Putting Adverse Drug Events
Into Perspective, 277 JAMA 341, 341 (1997).
6 See generally, Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the
Environment (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., 1995). Such "risk-risk
tradeoffs" confront all decisionmakers, in private life as well as in public policy. For
example, aspirin can ease a headache, but risk an upset stomach or even Reye's

syndrome.
7 DOT/NHTSA, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Occupant Crash
Protection (Final Rule), 62 F.R. 798, 798 (1997) (reporting that since their
introduction in the 1980s, driver-side airbags have saved 1500 lives while killing 19
drivers, and passenger-side airbags have saved 164 lives while killing 32 children). See
also National Transportation Safety Board, The Performance and Use of Child
Restraint Systems, Seatbelts, and Air Bags for Children in Passenger Vehicles,
Volume 1: Analysis, Safety Study NTSB/SS-96/01 (1996); Asra Q. Nomani &
Jeffrey Taylor, Shaky Statistics Are Driving the Air-Bag Debate, Wall Street J., Jan.
22, 1997, at B1. Cf. Matthew Wald, When Safety Devices Bite Back, New York
Times, Feb. 16, 1997, at E3 (reporting that aviation safety devices may increase risks).
8 See John Lancaster, Weighing the Gain in Oil-Spill Cures: Harm from
Aggressive Hot-Water Cleanup May Eclipse the Environmental Benefits, Washington
Post, Apr. 22, 1991, atA3.
9 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation 12-13 (1993); Health Effects Institute, Asbestos in Public and
Commercial Buildings: A Literature Review and Synthesis of Current Knowledge
(1991); Joshua T. Cohen, et al., Life Years Lost at Hazardous Waste Sites:
Remediation Worker Fatalities vs. Cancer Deaths to Nearby Residents, 17 Risk
Anal. 419 (1997); Alan F. Hoskin, J. Paul Leigh & Thomas W. Planek, Estimated
Risk of OccupationalFatalitiesAssociated with Hazardous Waste Site Remediation,
14 Risk Anal. 1011 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. Risk & Uncert.
5, 12-13 (1994).
10 See George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Regulating Pesticides, in Graham &
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substance or activity may forfeit the health and safety benefits that it
provides - for example, banning asbestos to prevent cancers might also
result in of its loss as the ideal lining for automobile brake pads, hence
increasing highway fatalities. 1 1 Dams and levees to control floods may
actually worsen them, and may cause siltation and subsidence
downstream. 1 2 Police chases of suspects (who might commit crimes if

not apprehended) may induce automobile accidents that kill innocent
bystanders. 1 3 Prohibiting addictive drugs may spawn violence among
drug suppliers. 1 4 Sentencing felons to mandatory minimum stays in
15
limited prison space may keep more violent offenders out of prison.
Risk management both helps and hurts.16 This is increasingly
accepted in medicine 17 but seems to confront more than a little
Wiener, supra note 6, at 173-192.
See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
See Jon Christensen, California Floods Change Thinking on Need to Tame
Rivers, New York Times, Feb. 4, 1997, at B10; John McPhee, The Control of Nature
3-92 (1989).
13 See, e.g., Chris Graves, Hot Pursuit: Is It a Bigger Threat than the Crime?,
Minneapolis Star Tribune, Aug. 13, 1996, at 1A (reporting that roughly 1 in 4 police
chases in Minnesota in 1995 ended in a collision); Teresa M. Hanafin, Panel Hears
Backers of Bill to Regulate Police Chases, Boston Globe, Mar. 24, 1992, at 31
(reporting over 300 fatalities from police chases nationwide in 1990); Editorial,
When Cops Give Chase, Sacramento Bee, July 19, 1995, at B6 (reporting that of
8,074 chases in California in 1994, 1,983 ended in collisions, injuring 1,306 people (of
whom 409 were innocent bystanders) and killing 39 (of whom 12 were innocent
bystanders)).
14 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jatrogenic Government: Social Policy and Drug
Research, American Scholar, 351-362 (Summer 1993); Robert MacCoun, Peter
Reuter & Thomas Schelling, Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes, 15 J. Pol.
Anal. & Mgmt. 330-352 (1996).
15 See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got To Do With It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal)Criminal Law; Susan Estrich, Hard Time Won't Fit All the Crime, USA
Today, July 18, 1996, at 15A (citing a CATO Institute report that calls lengthy prison
terms for drug offenders "the best things that ever happened to violent criminals who
"end up being released to make room").
16 Additional discussion and examples are provided in John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk TraAdeoffi, in Graham & Wiener, supra note 6, at
1-41; Breyer, supra note 9, at 12-13, 22-23; Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights
Against Risk, 86 Colum. L.Rev. 495 (1986); Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of
the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 851; Cass R. Sunstein, HealthHealth Trade-Offi, in Free Markets and Social Justice 298 (1996); Edward Warren
& Gary Marchant, More Good Than Harm: A Hippocratic Oath for Administrative
Agencies, 20 Ecol. L.Q. 379 (1993); Lester B. Lave, The Strategy of Social
Regulation (Brookings 1981); Chauncey Starr & Christopher Whipple, Risks of Risk
Decisions, 208 Science 1114 (1980).
12
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cognitive dissonance (and indignation) in the regulatory context. To be
clear: The point is absolutely not that regulation always hurts, nor even
routinely outweighs the help. 1 8 It is almost sure that risk regulation
19
over the last three decades has, overall, helped more than it has hurt.
And tolerating regulation's adverse countervailing risks may sometimes
or even often be worth the gains in reducing target risks. But regulatory
institutions that hurt more than they help, and even those that help
more than they hurt in the aggregate, could potentially do much better
could maximize overall helpfulness - by attending more carefully
to countervailing risks. The point is not to skewer well-intentioned
protective policies, but to recognize that good intentions are only part
of the battle: They are necessary but not sufficient to design successful
risk regulation. Successful policy advance requires not a choice between
moral outrage and careful analysis, but a healthy combination of both.
Concern about countervailing risks has no political brand. Both
conservatives, liberals and centrists worry about the dysfunctions of the
regulatory state. Each may emphasize different examples conservatives may worry about the side effects of health and
environmental rules, while liberals may worry about the side effects of
dams, police practices and harsh criminal penalties - but their concerns
have the same analytic basis. Countervailing risks are a generic
challenge. The first modern environmental law, NEPA, 2 0 was a
response to the countervailing risks of government interventions to
achieve non-environmental policy goals such as transportation and
17 See supra notes 1 and 5.
18

The list of risk-tradeoff examples is provided to show the ubiquity of

countervailing risks, not to vouch for the truth of the particular examples. Each
warrants careful empirical study, and some of the claims of risk tradeoffs are no doubt
exaggerated. For example, the countervailing risk of occupational injury induced by
asbestos and Superfund cleanups, cited in note 9, supra, is not the full risk that
workers would face in the cleanup activity, but the incremental change in their
employment risk - i.e., the cleanup risk relative to the risk they would have faced in

alternative employment. See Stephen F. Williams, The Era of 'Risk-Risk" and the
Problem of Keeping the APA Up to Date, 63U. Chi. L.Rev. 1375, 1380 (1996).
Moreover, cleanup workers may incur risks more voluntarily (and hence receive more
adequate ex ante compensation) than do residents exposed to unabated contaminents.
19 See Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 6-10. This point is difficult to test
empirically because we lack thorough data on health and environmental quality
indicators, and because the counterfactual (a different regulatory history) is difficult
to model and test. See id. at 10.
20

42 USC 4332.
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electrification. Worrying about countervailing risks is not antienvironmental, or anti-law-and-order, or anti-regulatory, it is proresults; it is the sober habit of the pragmatic optimist.
Figure 1
Risk Protection Frontier (RPF)
Protection
VS.
Target Risk
A

2

C

B

RPF

RPF1
Zero
Protection

2

Protection
VS.
Countervailing Risk

Adapted from John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, Confronting
Risk Tradeoffi, in Risk vs. Risk, 26, 28, 38, note 6.

Managing risk-risk tradeoffs is an exercise in judgment. Previously,
John Graham and I sketched a model of a "risk protection frontier"
drawn from the concept of a "production possibility frontier" in
microeconomics. 2 1 A production possibility frontier traces the
combinations of alternative goods that a society can provide with
efficient use of limited resources; the RPF traces the combinations of
protection against alternative risks that a society can achieve with
efficient use of limited resources. The RPF illustrates the need to weigh
tradeoffs along the frontier between alternative risks (in Figure 1, the
choice between points A and B on RPF 1 - with point A representing
relatively more protection against the target risk and point B
representing relatively more protection against the countervailing risk).
The RPF also illustrates the opportunity to move toward "risk-superior"
outcomes by shifting the frontier outward through innovative
approaches that reduce multiple risks in concert (in Figure 1, the move
21

Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 25-29.
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from RPF 1 to RPF 2 ). For example, if automobile airbag technology at
point A saves adults but kills children, depowering or disconnecting
these airbags is a move along RPF 1 to point B, where fewer children will
be killed but fewer adults will be saved. Developing a new "smart"
airbag technology is a move to a point like C on RPF 2 , where both
fewer children are killed and more adults are saved.
The RPF illustrates the short- and longer-term challenges of riskrisk tradeoffs, but it does not display why they unduly occur. If one
able decisionmaker felt the full consequences of allocating regulatory
attention between the target and countervailing risks, she could
presumably make a sound judgment about the tradeoff. It is not clear
from the RPF model why she would systematically favor one and
neglect the other.
There are reasons to believe that excessive countervailing risks are
systematically generated by institutions that regulate target risks. These
include jurisdictional specialization and fragmentation among risk
managers (from physicians to government agencies); selective attention
to certain kinds of hazards and other heuristic decisionmaking biases;
the distortionary influence of more vocal interest groups; and the real
22
costs of analyzing and deliberating about intervention side effects.
Iatrogenic injury in medical care is a salient subject of study by
regulatory analysts for at least two reasons. First, injury caused by
medical care is important in its own right, representing a large fraction
of the countervailing risks induced by society's wide array of efforts to
manage risks. Second, understanding iatrogenic injury in the medical
setting can offer important insights in the public policy setting.
Here, I develop the analogy from medical to regulatory
iatrogenesis, and make these points: (1) countervailing risks are endemic
in fragmented decisionmaking; (2) countervailing risks of risk
management interventions are conceptually distinct from the adverse
health effects of income loss ("health-health" tradeoffs); (3) in light of
countervailing risks, comparative risk analysis is not just a candidate for
prioritizing independent target risks but an inescapable feature of risk
management; (4) the use of "default" assumptions in risk assessment
can be self-defeating; (5) risk management institutions face pressure to
22 See Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffi, in
Graham & Wiener, supra note 6, at 225-242; Sunstein, supra note 16.
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expand and proliferate in response to countervailing risks; (6) optimal
management of countervailing risks seeks neither zero tolerance of ("do
no harm") nor zero attention to countervailing risks ("ignore side
effects"); it rather seeks to maximize the difference between target risk
reduction and countervailing risk induction, and to minimize the sum
of the costs of analyzing and addressing countervailing risks
(deliberation costs) plus the costs of leaving countervailing risks
unaddressed (error costs); and (7) ideally this optimization is advanced
over time through assigning responsibility for risk policy to institutions
with low deliberation and error costs, and ultimately through the
innovation of "risk-superior" regulatory approaches.

Iatrogenic Injury in Medicine
A caregiver responds to target ailments (or risk factors for a future
ailments) by examining patients, diagnosing (or forecasting) and
prescribing a regimen of therapy. The objective is to ameliorate or
prevent an ailment. But these methods can also generate side effects.
Recent examples include adverse drug reactions (from the mundane to
horror stories like thalidomide), diseases spread by vaccines (sometimes
rekindling the disease to be prevented), infections conveyed in blood
transfusions (from common bacteria to HIV), adverse effects of
diagnostic tests (such as cancers induced by mammography), and
cancers induced by estrogen replacement intended to prevent
osteoporosis and heart disease in post-menopausal women. 2 3 The
problem is "as old as Medicine."2 4 One of the earliest investigations of
25
iatrogenesis was on puerperal sepsis by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.
23

See P.E. Sartwell, Jatrogenic Disease: An Epidemiologic Perspective, 4 Int'l J.

Health Services 89, 89-90 (1974); Evridild Hatziandreu, Constance Williams & John
D. Graham, Estrogen Therapy for Menopause, in Graham & Wiener, supra note 6,

at 42-52.
24 Davies, supra note 1, at 1. The adage "the cure is worse than the disease" has
been around for at least two thousand years. See John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations
111 and n.2 (Emily Morrison Beck, ed., 15th ed., 1980) (quoting Plutarch, Publius
Syrus, Francis Bacon, and others).
25 O.W. Holmes, The Contagiousness of PuerperalFever, N. Eng. Q. J. Med. &
Surgery 1-23 (Apr. 1843), cited in Sartwell, supra note 23, at 89. Holmes' report
"met with profound skepticism and hostility by the medical profession [until decades
later when] the bacteriologists demonstrated [that the infection was transmitted by a
microbe,] the streptococcus." Sartwell, supra note 24, at 89. Puerperal sepsis, a
potentially fatal infection acquired during childbirth, was common among new
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 39 [Witer 1998]

Sir William Osler intoned: "One of the first duties of the physician is to
26
educate the masses not to take medicine."
Risk management broadly encompasses all institutions geared
toward protecting human and ecological health, including public health
infrastructure, criminal law, hospitals and other medical care providers,
and transportation safety, environmental, consumer and occupational
safety regulation. The medical care delivery system is one of the largest
and most important of these components. Roughly 14% of U.S.
national income is spent on that system compared to just under 3% on
27
environmental compliance.
The challenge of iatrogenic injury faces physicians and patients
every day. "In addition to conferring benefits, most effective therapies
have clinically important side effects, and in some instances it is not
clear whether the benefits outweigh the harm." 2 8 At virtually every
juncture, physicians and patients choose between at least two alternative
therapies for a given target ailment, one of which is more effective at
treating the target ailment but poses more serious side effects, and the
other of which poses less serious side effects but is also less effective at
treating the target ailment.
Empirical study of the modern medical system suggests that
iatrogenesis is serious. In the most thorough analysis to date, the
Harvard Medical Practice Study Group studied a representative sample
of over 30,000 hospital records from over 50 hospitals in New York
State. Using carefully developed protocols and trained reviewers, it
found that 3.7% of all hospitalizations induced iatrogenic health events,
of which just more than one in eight (14% of all iatrogenic injuries, and
29
about 0.5% of all hospitalizations) were iatrogenic fatalities.
mothers in the 184 0s because physicians typically did not wash their hands before
delivering babies. See infra note 90 [re Semelweiss].
26 William Osler, Aphorisms from His Bedside Teachings 112 (1961), quoted in
Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations 165 (Tony Augarde, ed., 1991).
27 HHS, Health USA and Prevention Profile (1992); EPA, Environmental
Investments: The Costs of a Clean Environment (1990).
28 Laupacis, Sackett & Roberts, supra note 1, at 1731. On the general phenomenon
of iatrogenic injury, see also the references cited supra note 1.
29 Weiler, et al., supra note 3, at 43-44. These research results were originally
published by substantially the same authors in Troyen A. Brennan, et al., Incidence of
Adverse Effects and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients Results of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study I, 324 N. Eng. J. Med. 370 (1991). The Harvard Study
noted a study in California in the 1970s which found that 4.6% of all hospitalizations
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Extrapolating this data to the full U.S. population, suggests a national
annual total of over 1.2 million iatrogenic injuries and'over 150,000
iatrogenic deaths from hospitalization - amounting to 7.5% of all
deaths in the nation each year, more fatalities than are caused each year
by, e.g., auto (40,000 to 50,000) and occupational accidents (about
30
6,000) combined.
The Harvard Medical Practice Study also disaggregated its results
and found, controlling for other factors, that certain characteristics were
significantly associated with higher iatrogenic injury rates: higher
patient age (even when controlling for illness severity), lack of health
31
insurance, and hospital location in a poor minority neighborhood.
Iatrogenic injuries were thus particularly likely to befall groups that may
have less effective voices in the health care system.
Adverse drug events (ADEs) - including allergic reactions,
misprescribed drugs, and drug-drug interactions - are a large
component of iatrogenic injury. 3 2 Studies in the 1970s shockingly
suggested that up to 30% of all U.S. hospital patients suffered ADEs
and, alone, may have accounted for as many as 140,000 deaths each
year. 3 3 More recent studies show ADEs being suffered by 0.7-6.5%
resulted in iatrogenic injury. Weiler, supra note 3, at 36. Studies in the 1960s found
that about 20% of hospitalized patients acquired an iatrogenic disease or injury of
some kind during their stay. See J.T. McLamb & R.R. Huntley, The Hazards of
Hospitalization, 60 Southern Med. J. 469 (May 1967); E.M. Schimmel, The
Physician as Pathogen, 16 J. Chronic Disease 1 (1963); E.M. Schimmel, The
Hazards of Hospitalization, 60 Ann. Internal Med. 100 (1964); Harry N. Beaty &
Robert G. Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 641.
30 Weiler, supra note 3, at 55. Death cannot be prevented, only delayed. The
Harvard Study did not estimate the years of life lost due to iatrogenic injuries. It is
plausible that the number of years of life lost due to a typical iatrogenic fatality would
be smaller than the number of life-years lost to such causes as automobile accidents
and occupational accidents, because the victims of iatrogenic injury are often elderly
and often already quite ill when they arrive at the hospital, and might therefore die of
the target ailment or of other causes in a short time even if medical care is provided
without error. See id. There may also be latent illnesses and fatalities associated with
exposures to toxic substances in the medical and occupational settings (and even in
automobiles, e.g. gasoline vapors), which are not captured in these short-term data.
31 Weiler, supra note 3 , at 47, 52.
32 The Harvard Medical Practice Study found ADEs to represent about 20% of all
iatrogenic injuries observed, afflicting about 0.7% of all patients. Lucian L. Leape, et
al., The Nature of Adverse Events in HospitalizedPatients: Results from the Harvard
Medical Practice Study II, 324 N. Eng. J. Med. 377 (1991).
33 Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Errors and Adverse Reactions Are Studied, New
York Times, Jan. 22, 1997, at A10; David C. Classen, et al., Adverse Drug Events in
9 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 39 [Winter 1998]

of hospital patients, 3 4 which still implies that some 200,000 to
2,000,000 patients are afflicted each year. 3 5 One study estimated that
suffering an average ADE is associated with roughly doubling the
patient's fatality risk. 3 6 Somewhere in the range of 2-27% of hospital
37
admissions appear to be instigated by prior medical ADEs.
These studies understate the full adverse impact of medical care on
patients, because they tend to count only short-term effects. They may
omit outcomes that manifest years later; unreported injuries; and
injuries in settings such as nursing homes, doctors' offices and homes.
And there might also be ecological risks, e.g, associated with the
handling of chemical, biological, and radioactive wastes. In sum, the
medical care component of society's risk regulation regime is the source
of quite significant countervailing risks.
Causation
the causes of adverse outcomes. 3 8
disentangle
It can be difficult to
The Harvard Medical Practice Study used careful protocols and trained
auditors to distinguish adverse events caused by the target ailment from
Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 301, 301 (Jan. 1997) (citing J. Porter & H. Jick,
Drug-related Deaths Among Medical Inpatients,237 JAMA 879 (1977)). The 1960s
studies cited above found that about half of all iatrogenic injuries (which in total
afflicted 20% of the hospitalized population in those studies) involved adverse drug
events; thus ADEs were found to injure 10% of hospital patients. See McLamb &
Huntley, supra note 29, at 470; Schimmel, supra note 29.
34 Leape et al., supra note 32 (finding an ADE rate of 0.7% in New York
hospitals); Classen et al., supra note 33, at 304 (reporting ADE rates of 2.4% in the
LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, and 6.5% in another study).
The wide differences in rates of overall iatrogenesis and ADEs reported by the
196 0s studies by McLamb & Huntley and by Schimmel, the 1977 study by Porter &
Jick, and the 1990s studies collected by the Harvard Medical Practice Group and by
Classen et al., could result from progress over time in controlling ADEs, from
differences in study methodologies, from differences in the hospitals being studied,
and from other factors.
35 Classen et al., supra note 33, at 304 (assuming roughly 30 million hospital
admissions per year). Classen et al., did not estimate the total number of ADE-related
deaths.
36 Id. at 303-304 & Table 3.
37 David W. Bates, et al., The Cost of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized
Patients, 277 JAMA 307, 311 (Jan. 1997) (citing J.M. McKenney & W.L. Harrison,
Drug-Related Hospital Admissions, 33 Am. J. Hosp. Pharm. 792 (1976), and T.R.
Einarson, Drug-Related HospitalAdmissions, 27 Ann. Pharmacothe. 832 (1993)).
38 See Weiler, supra note 3, at 23-24, 33-36, 55-59. The Harvard Group
ultimately decided that only 5% of the causation judgments they made were truly
"close calls." Id. at 146.
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those caused by the care provided. That a patient takes a turn for the
worse after medical care does not mean the care was the cause; it is
important to control for how sick the patient was (the severity of target
ailment) because patients that are more ill are generally more fragile,
39
and may also require more risky interventions to save them.
Several underlying sources of iatrogenic injury appear to be
important. At first blush, one might point to the probabilistic nature of
side effects and the physician's incomplete knowledge of the full effects
of a given therapy on a particular individual. But unless this uncertainty
is somehow irreducible, the problem of incomplete prediction is really a
problem of the cost of obtaining more complete predictive knowledge,
the cost of sharing such knowledge, the cost of employing safer
alternative therapies, and the ability of patients to monitor and reward
health care providers for reducing iatrogenic risks.
Medical provider payment structures may be influential. The
average ADE, for example, generates an additional $2000 or so of
4
medical bills (and there is substantial variance around this average). 0
To a provider paid on a fee-for-service basis, the iatrogenic side effects
of initial treatment might constitute an unintentional source of
additional revenues (up to the point that the iatrogenesis drives the
patient to choose a different provider, or to expire), and such a provider
would therefore have less financial incentive to prevent iatrogenesis. The
provider pre-paid a monthly sum for health maintenance, by contrast,
may regard iatrogenic side effects as a drain on the provider's profits (if
the side effect would be expected to occur while the patient is still
39 Id. at 57, 138. This finding implies that the countervailing risk is itself partly a
function of the target risk. It suggests that, other things equal, regulatory interventions

to rescue more desperate or deicate situations may pose more acute countervailing
risks than preventive efforts to keep healthy people and ecosystems in a healthy state.
On the other hand, widespread preventive efforts (such as immunization programs,
the use of preventive doses of antibiotics in "infection-prone" patients with viral
infections, and "pollution prevention") can expose larger populations to countervailing
risks (such as illnesses induced by immunization, and the growth of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria) and can cost more as they address a larger potential target population. Beaty
& Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 655. Cf. Tammy Tengs et al., Five-Hundred LifeSaving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 Risk Anal. 369 (1995)
(showing that preventive health and environmental measures may be more or less costeffective than treatment of manifest ailments).
40 Classen et al., supra note 33, at 304 ($2013 per average ADE, with a range from
$677 to $9022); Bates et al., supra note 37, at 310 ($2595 per average ADE, $4685
per average ADE deemed preventable).
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under contract), and therefore may have more financial incentive to
prevent iatrogenesis. (Non-financial factors, such as the physician's
professional ethics, might swamp these effects.) Controlling for other
factors, do pre-paid HMOs in fact have lower rates of iatrogenic injury
than fee-for-service providers? A study of iatrogenic injury rates
4
differentiated by provider payment structure would be illuminating. 1
Malpractice law may also be significant. Are providers more likely
to be found liable for administering a treatment that induces an
iatrogenic side effect, or for failing to treat the target ailment? The
answer will vary by jurisdiction, by medical context, and by historical
context. Disproportionate liability for failure to treat may accelerate
iatrogenesis, while disproportionate liability for side effects may inhibit
initial treatment. The revenue and liability structures facing the
manufacturers of drugs, devices and other medical equipment, and the
information and incentives that they pass on to health care providers,
may also influence the rate of iatrogenesis.
But the major source of iatrogenesis appears to be fragmentation in
the system of medical care delivery. Inadequate sharing of information
across subunits of the hospital appears to be the most important cause
of iatrogenic injury. 4 2 These structures have analogies in the regulatory
state. One agency's mission to reduce a target risk may induce a
countervailing risk in another agency's domain. Is information about
adverse side effects shared across regulatory committees and agencies?
Is dealing with the countervailing risks of prior regulations perceived as
bureaucratically rewarding or bothersome by regulatory policymakers?
Successfully managing the countervailing risks of risk regulation will
41 Evidently no such studies have yet been conducted, and confront certain
methodological challenges. Personal communications with Jeffre Koplan, Prudential
Center for Health Care Research, Atlanta GA, and Harold Luft, U.C.S.F. Medical
School, August 1997. Meanwhile, HMOs may provide less effective treatment of
target risks in response to cost-containment incentives. For discussion of the
comparative overall safety of different provider arrangements, see Clark C.
Havighurst, Making Health PlansAccountable for the Quality of Care, 31 Georgia L.

Rev. 587, 592-94 (1997).

Lucian L. Leape et al., Systems Analysis of Adverse Drug Events, 274 JAMA 35
(1995); Timothy S. Lesar, Laurie Briceland & Daniel S. Stein, Factors Related to
Errors in Medication Prescribing,277 JAMA 312, 312, 315-316 (Jan. 1997); Classen
et al., supra note 33, at 305; Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise
Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care Systems, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 381,412-13 (1994).
42
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require more integrated information systems and new institutional
arrangements to encourage attention to potential side effects.
"CountervailingRisks" are to "Health-HealthAnalysis"
as Zatrogenesisis to Triage
In the hospital context, the challenge of iatrogenic side effects is
conceptually distinct from the challenge of triage. Triage involves
allocating scarce therapeutic resources among the competing demands
facing the hospital - deciding which patients warrant attention first
and most intensively. Iatrogenesis, by contrast, arises even if all patients
are treated identically; an unlimited supply of medicine can cause
ADEs in every patient. Triage is the problem that care provided to one
patient is costly, not just in out-of-pocket expenses but in the diversion
of that care from other patients - in the foregone opportunity to use
that care for other purposes. Iatrogenesis is the problem that even if
therapy were costless, thereby enabling all patients to receive treatment,
that treatment would still generate adverse health outcomes as well as
beneficial health outcomes. Iatrogenesis requires a more complex
calculation of therapeutic benefit, rather than an allocation of therapy
among patients.
The same distinction applies in the larger social context.
"Countervailing risks" of regulation are analogous to iatrogenic injuries,
whereas the "social costs" of regulation are the societal version of triage.
This distinction has been blurred of late under the ambiguous heading
of "health-health analysis" (HHA) (or the even more generic "risk-risk
analysis"). 4 3 HHA is an analytic tool for measuring the adverse health
impacts of income loss - usually, income loss caused by regulatory
policies. It involves calculating the mortality associated with each dollar
diverted from workers' and consumers' pockets by regulation. It is
based on the empirical observation that "wealthier is healthier" -

that

poorer households spend less on health-promoting goods and services
43 See the symposium on the health impacts of income losses, opaquely titled
"Risk-Risk Analysis," and including such articles as W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk
Analysis, 8 J. Risk & Uncert. 5 (1994); and Randall Lutter & John F. Morall III,
Health-Health Analysis, 8 J. Risk & Uncert. 43 (1994). See also, Frank B. Cross,
When EnvironmentalRegulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 Ecol.
L.Q. 729 (1995). Other articles have used more precise terminology. See Ralph L.
Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8J. Risk & Uncert. 95
(1994); W. Kip Viscusi & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of
Expenditures, 8 J. Risk & Uncert. 19 (1994); Frank B. Cross, supra, note 16, at 915
(referring to the Health Risks of Economic Costs).
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and have shorter life expectancies. 4 4 HHA is thus a translation of the
"social cost" side of benefit-cost analysis into "risk" units. Instead of
"monetizing benefits," it is "riskizing costs." Thus, whereas
countervailing risk refers to iatrogenesis, HHA is measuring the
allocation of scarce social resources among competing health-promoting
investments (triage).
HHA is in a sense a more broadly applicable analytic tool than the
concept of countervailing risks of risk regulation, because HHA applies
to any government action affecting income (e.g., the Fed raising
interest rates), not just to risk regulation. Yet in another sense "HealthHealth Analysis" is a very narrow subset of the universe of
countervailing risks. Income is only one of many pathways through
which regulation may adversely affect health, so HIA ignores nonincome-mediated countervailing risks (e.g. asbestos removal risks,
cross-media pollution shifts, or police chase crashes). And HHA
excludes all harms to endpoints other than human health (e.g.,
45
ecological harms).
This distinction should not be conflated under the undifferentiated
title of "risk-risk analysis" or similarly general headings. Countervailing
risks are not merely a translation of social costs into risk units.
Countervailing risks do not depend on compliance cost; a highly costeffective regulation, or even one imposing zero or negative costs, could
still induce iatrogenic risks. For example, immunizations and energy
efficiency are both urged as cost-saving interventions, implying zero (or
benign) income-related health impacts; but each may portend
important countervailing risks (e.g., immunizations tend to induce
44 There are methodological debates about the basis and utility of HHA
calculations. See John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang & John S. Evans, Poorer is
Riskier, 12 RiskAnal. 333 (1992) (showing that changes in permanent income and
changes in temporary income have very different impacts on health); V. Kerry Smith,

Donald J. Epp, & Kurt Schwabe, Cross-Country Analyses Don't Estimate HealthHealth Responses, 8 J. Risk & Uncert. 67 (1994) (questioning cross-country evidence
of "wealthier is healthier"); Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review
of Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis, 8 J. Risk &
Uncert. 111 (1995) (doubting usefulness of HHA); Williams, supra note 18, at 1381

(questioning calculation of marginal propensity to spend income on health-related
goods).
45 See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1423, 14481455 (1996) (distinguishing income-mediated HHA from other "variants of what has

come to be known as risk-risk analysis").
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some level of disease, and energy efficiency measures may trap air
pollutants inside homes). And some very costly interventions might
pose negligible countervailing risks. Countervailing risks are a neglected
46
iatrogenic impact of regulation, irrespective of social cost triage.
Conflating iatrogenic countervailing risks and income-mediated
health effects threatens to forfeit the conceptual advance offered by
recognizing countervailing risks. Agencies have been analyzing social
costs in dollar terms all along (unless forbidden by statute, and even
then probably sub rosa), but they have typically neglected
countervailing risks. Countervailing risks, understood as regulatory
iatrogenesis, require a more complex calculation of regulatory benefits,
not a translation of social costs into income-mediated health losses.
Speaking as though income-mediated health effects is what is meant by
"risk-risk" or "health-health" tradeoffs will tempt analysts and
policymakers to neglect yet again the pervasive income-independent
iatrogenic countervailing risks of regulation.
Institutional Insights for the Regulatory State
The medical care context also offers important insights for the
study of other components of the risk management regime, such as
46 Consider a simple example: the country whose citizens take a shower every
morning. The showers are an intervention to reduce the target risks of personal
discomfort, sleepyheadedness, and interpersonal spillovers of body odor (the last is a
classic externality, internalized by unwritten social norms of reciprocal cooperation).
But there is "no free sponge"; the daily showers impose two kinds of losses on this
nation: (i) social opportunity costs, including time that could be devoted to another
activity (such as reading more articles on risk analysis) and the money that could be
spent on something besides hot water; and (ii) the countervailing risks of the shower
itself, such as soap in the eye, drying the skin and scalp, and slipping or drowning in
the tub (which kills roughly 300 and injures roughly 150,000 Americans every year;
see National Safety Council, Accident Facts 10, 102 (1994)). (From these bathing
risks must be subtracted the risks of the alternate activity, e.g. paper cuts and anxiety
from reading the risk articles). HHA measures the health detriment of item (i), the
time and money diverted into bathing. This reflects the bather's triage decision
among alternative health-promoting opportunities. Countervailing risks are
independent of this opportunity cost allocation decision. Indeed, showering faster in
order to save time and use less hot water (to reduce opportunity costs) might even
increase the prospect of countervailing risks such as slips in the tub.
Similarly, even if the cost to industry and consumers of reducing levels of urban
ozone (as recently mandated by the EPA) were zero, reduced urban ozone would still
entail the countervailing risk of cancers from increased ultraviolet irradiation. See
Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone:
Implicationsfor the NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Science & Technology News no. 3 at 142A146A (1997).
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government regulatory agencies. The ways in which medical care
institutions generate and try to prevent iatrogenic injuries can be highly
instructive for understanding the ways in which the regulatory state
generates and could better avoid countervailing risks.
Many observers have analogized the regulatory state (and its
failures) to the medical care system. The 19th-century pathologist
Rudolf Virchow quipped that "politics is nothing but medicine on a
grand scale," 4 7 and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has recently cast
4
the war on drugs as an example of "iatrogenic government." 8 Radical
social critic Ivan Illich, in his diatribe against iatrogenic injuries caused
by the medical care system, described public health regulation as a
"therapeutic bureaucracy," 4 9 which he saw as likewise generating
adverse effects on public health. The German political scientist Martin
Jiinicke, in his study of forms of "state failure," classified the adverse
side effects of public health and environmental regulation as
"technocratic iatrogenesis." 50
The InstitutionalSources of CountervailingRisks:
Fragmentationand DeliberationCost
The evidence from the medical care context suggests that the
primary source of excessive countervailing risks lies not in malpractice
but in institutional design - in particular in the fragmentation of the
risk management system. Most iatrogenesis is not caused by negligent
errors by individual physicians. The Harvard study of New York's
hospitals found that 72.3% of iatrogenic injuries were not due to
physician error. 5 1 In the regulatory agency context, where decisions
47 Quoted in Moynihan, supra note 14, at 355.
48 Moynihan, supra note 14, at351.
49

Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health 155 (Pantheon Books,

New York, 1976). Illich argued that "iatrogenesis has become medically irreversible: a
feature built right into the medical endeavor," id. at 34, and he took the same view
of the adverse side effects of public health regulation, id at 35. Illich's demonization
of professional medicine is not unique; even pillars of the medical community have
argued that iatrogenic injuries render a negative net benefit to society. E.g., Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., Currents and Counter-Currents in Medical Science, Address
delivered to the Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Medical Society, Boston, May
30, 1860, quoted in Sartwell, supra note 23, at 92 ("I firmly believe that if the whole
materia medica as now used could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all
the better for mankind and all the worse for the fishes.").
50 Martin J~inicke, State Failure: The Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society 39

(Alan Braley, tr., 1990).
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are much more centralized and bureaucratized than in medicine, it even

less likely that countervailing risks are the "fault" of "regulatory
negligence" by individual officials. Instead, countervailing risks are a
standard feature of helpful, well-intentioned and even well-designed

regulations. They are a product of institutional structures and incentive
systems, not of individual caprice. Thus, efforts should focus not on
assigning blame but on designing less caustic therapies - constructive
regulatory systems that achieve target risk goals while causing fewer and
less severe countervailing risks.
The salient causal factors in iatrogenic injury are systemic features
of the health care delivery system. Many or most iatrogenic injuries
involve lacunae in hospital administration. 5 2 One of the principal
institutional flaws was the failure to share important information across
the hospital system. 53 Different medical specialties within the same
hospital may fail to share information on patient characteristics (e.g.,
drug allergies) and on drug-drug interactions; for example, one
specialist may prescribe a therapy without being informed of the danger
it presents to the particular patient (of which other specialists are
aware). 5 4 Or institutional features ancillary to therapy can act as
51 Weiler, supra note 3, at 43. This statistic obviously depends on the protocol for
distinguishing causes of ailments. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.

According to the Harvard study, most iatrogenic injury results from treatments that
comply with the prevailing standard of good medical care. This reflects the adage that
every medical intervention is a two-edged sword. "No drug is completely harmless,
even when used correctly." McLamb & Huntley, supra note 29, at 471.
52 In the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 58% of iatrogenic injuries were classified
as resulting from flaws or gaps in hospital administrative procedures. Weiler, supra
note 3, at 54; Leape et al., supra note 32. The Harvard study found that the rate of
iatrogenic injury varied across hospitals by a factor of 40 (ranging from 0.2-7.9% of
all hospital admissions), and across medical specialties by a factor of 32 (ranging from
0.5% in neonatal care to 16.1% in vascular surgery). Weiler, supra note 3, at 47, 53.
This further suggests the potential for improvements through systematic study across
institutions and settings, rather than focusing on individual physicians.
53 See Lesar, Briceland & Stein, supra note 42, at 315 ("[I]nadequate knowledge,
availability, or appreciation of important patient information and drug factors were
the most commonly identified related factors or proximal causes. ... [I]t is unlikely
that achieving the level of... [physicians'] education needed to dramatically reduce
errors is possible. Instead, redesigning the medication ordering and use system to
correct errors and improve outcomes is necessary.") (citations omitted).
54 Id. at 316 ("Prescribing medications, or classes of medications, to which the
patient had a documented allergy occurred frequently. Many patients are placed at
risk for hypersensitivity reactions due to an inadequate provision of timely
information regarding allergy history....").
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disease vectors; historical examples include the spread of infections
through patients' bedclothes, laundry chutes, and eyedropppers. 5 5 The
cutting edge of medical care reform is the effort to bring a "systems
analysis" approach to measuring and improving hospital functions and
patient outcomes. 5 6 One manifestation is the increasing organization
of medical care into more integrated HMOs and managed care
operations in which primary care physicians are positioned to monitor
and manage patients' multiple conditions and various treatments in
concert. 57 Another is the call for greater sharing of information across
58
the hospital through computers.
Like hospitals, the regulatory state is also fragmented into multiple
independent specialties. 5 9 These include numerous federal agencies
such as EPA (and its internal subagencies), OSHA, FDA, NHTSA,
FAA, CPSC, NRC, DOI, and USDA/FS; multiple political
jurisdictions (e.g., states, cities, nations); and statutes focused on single
arenas or parts of problems (e.g., regulating one pesticide at a time; or
regulating outdoor air, indoor air, water, wastes, land, and other risk
vectors separately). Each specialty operates without coordinating much
with its neighbors. Regulations adopted by one state may induce side
effects ("spillovers") on other states. 6 0 Clean air regulations adopted
by the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act may induce industry to shift
55 Audy, supra note 1, at 49-50 (citing the "embarrassingly long time" it took for
hospitals to realize that such routine functions were the source of significant iatrogenic
illness).
56 Avorn, supra note 5, at 341, 342; Leape et al., supra note 42.
57 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 243-246.
58 Avorn, supra note 5, at 342 (emphasizing "the enormous power that hospital
computing systems can bring to bear on the detection and definition of dinical events,
both wanted and unwanted."); Classen et al., supra note 33, at 305 ("[H]ospitals
detect only about 5% of ongoing ADEs... computerized identification of ADEs
offers great promise in more efficient and effective detection. [Through such systems]
almost 50% of all ADEs are potentially preventable."); Sartwell, supra note 23, at 91
(urging use of "a more comprehensive hospital monitoring system, involving
continuous surveillance, with collected data subjected to regular computer analysis").
59 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 23, at 237-240; J. Clarence Davies & Jan
Mazurek, Regulating Pollution: Does the U.S. System Work? (RFF, 1997); Stuart L.
Deutsch, Setting Priorities:Principles to Improve Environmental Policy, 68 Chi.Kent L.Rev. 43, 51-52 (1992); Barry G. Rabe, Fragmentation and Integration in State
Environmental Management (Conservation Foundation, 1986).
60 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144 U. Penn. L.Rev. 2341 (1996).
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pollution to water or waste settings, and Congress acknowledged as
much when it enacted RCRA. 61 EPA regulations to prevent inhalation
of asbestos fibers may create risks for highway fatalities. 6 2 Regulating
one pesticide at a time may induce the use of risky substitutes.
Moreover, like drug-drug interactions, multiple regulations adopted by
63
different agencies might interact in unexpected ways.
Fragmentation is not due to malice or incompetence. It reflects
both the advantages of specialized expertise, and the structural
incentives that drive the Congress to match initiatives to the narrow
interests of constituent groups and thereby to proliferate subcommittee
chairmanships and opportunities for legislative credit-claiming. The
root cause is the cost of comprehensiveness. Agencies, committees and
health care providers have scarce resources (especially time), and taking
account of side effects is costly (especially in delaying attention to
target risks). There is a division of labor among agencies, committees,
and physicians in large part because specializing enables greater
attention to the target issue at lower cost. This is a tradeoff of depth
versus breadth. Regulating one symptom, one pollutant, or one arena at
a time reduces the costs of gathering and analyzing information about
all side matters. Each specialist agency has little incentive to monitor
the effects of its interventions on other regulatory domains, and each is
driven by legislative mandates drawn up by specialist legislative
64
committees which impel the agency to take a narrow approach.
61 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 USC 6901(b)(3);

Symposium on Integrated Pollution Control, 22 Envtl Law 1-348 (1992); Lakshman
Guruswamy, The Casefor IntegratedPollution Control 54 Law & Contemporary

Problems 41 (Autumn 1991); Robert W. Hahn & Eric H. Mal~s, Can Regulatory

Institutions Cope with Cross-Media Pollution?, 40 J. Air & Waste Mgmt Ass'n 24

(1990). Cf Hilary Sigman, Cross-Media Pollution: Responses to Restrictions on

Chlorinated Solvent Releases, 72 Land Economics 298 (Aug. 1996) (reporting

complex impacts of different single-medium pollution controls).

62 See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d 1225.
63

In like fashion, there is growing recognition that interactions among multiple

exposures (e.g., to multiple environmental toxins) can produce adverse health and

ecological outcomes different from what each of these exposures would produce in

isolation, but our risk assessment methods and regulatory schemes still generally focus
on one hazard at a time. The narrow approach may reduce information costs but no
doubt increases error costs. As we consider multiple regulations in concert, we should
also consider multiple hazards in concert.

64 Free-rider problems may also hamper both the medical and regulatory regimes.
For example, patients with viral infections often demand to be medicated with

antibiotics, even though antibiotic drugs treat bacteria, not viruses. Physicians may feel
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The implication is that solutions should emphasize reconnecting
specialist risk managers. The Harvard Medical Practice Study
recommends refocusing prevention of iatrogenic injury from individual
physicians (targeted by the medical malpractice system) to health care
enterprises as a whole. 6 5 It notes that modern hospital administrators
are abandoning the false image of physician negligence and are coming
to see iatrogenesis as a systemic challenge of risk management
throughout the hospital. 6 6 One tack is developing more integrated
information systems so that specialists can share data wherever patients
go. 6 7 Another is renewed interest in "treating the whole patient" via
primary care physicians - who dispatch patients to specialists and
monitor patients' overall health. 6 8 Similarly, the regulatory regime
should invest in integrated information and monitoring to track crosspressure to comply. See John F. Lauerman, Homicidal Cultures, Harvard Magazine
(Mar.-Apr. 1997) at 18, 20-21 ("Physicians say patients feel slighted when they come
away from an office visit without a prescription, and tend to keep looking until they
find someone who will write one. ... '[I]t takes less time to hand out a prescription
than to explain why one isn't needed.'"). A recent study indicated that 93% of
parents surveyed erroneously believed that antibiotics were warranted for their
children's ear infections; 71% of physicians reported receiving frequent requests from
parents to prescribe antibiotics inappropriately, and 35% said they occasionally went
along with these requests; and 18% of parents administered antibiotics at home before
consulting a physician. D.A. Palmer & H. Bauchner, Parents' and Physicians' Views
on Antibiotics, 99 Pediatrics (June 1997) at E61-E65. The catch is that overuse of
antibiotics fosters new resistant strains of bacteria, harming society as a whole. See
Staph Germ on Way to Being Unstoppable: CDC Warns Doctors to Use Antibiotics
More Sparingly to Slow Resistance, Raleigh News & Observer, May 29, 1997, at
14A; Resisting Resistance, The Economist, May 31, 1997, at 73-74; New Strain of
Staph is Resistant, New York Times, June 3, 1997, at B9; Jeffiey A. Fisher, The
Plague Makers: How We Are Creating Catastrophic New Epidemics - and What
We Must Do to Avert Them (1994). Analogously, perceived sufferers' demands for
greater or episodic regulation of target risks may expose the general public to the
ensuing countervailing risks.
Free riding may also explain some reluctance to accept vaccination. Each
vaccination imposes some risk of side effects, and offers diminishing marginal benefits
to the nth recipient as the fraction of the population vaccinated approaches 100%.
Hence each patient has an incentive to refuse vaccination, but widespread nonvaccination would invite the larger population risk of the disease itself. On the other
hand, a bandwagon effect (and perhaps a little altruism) may explain observed high
rates of vaccination. See Ann Bostrom, Lessons for Vaccine Risk Communication, 8
Risk 173, 174-177, 183-184 (1997).
65 Weiler, supra note 3, at 145-146; See also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 42;
Havighurst, supra note 41.
66 See Weiler, supra note 3, at 174 n.14.
67 Altman, supra note 33; Weiler, supra note 3, at 59, 147-149.
68 Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 243-244.
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specialty impacts and overall outcomes. And to better "treat the whole
patient," it should consider creating "primary risk managers" (for large
agencies, the White House and Congress as a whole) - umbrella
entities with the authority to supervise dispatching risks to relevant
specialist agencies and committees, confront and supervise decisions
about risk-risk tradeoffs, monitor ongoing results, and aim to head off
69
and resolve cross-jurisdictional countervailing risks.
The Imperative of ComparativeRisk Analysis
The medical context illustrates the necessity of carefully comparing
target and countervailing risks. The risk-risk dilemma in treatment is
described in clinical decision theory as a version of the decision analyst's
"standard gamble" (Figure 2).70 Each of two alternative therapies, A
and B, is depicted as having two possible outcomes, each with a
different probability. Option A may yield a cure but also may yield a
severe side effect, while Option B may yield a more mild side effect
but also a more mild improvement. (Option B can also be understood
as the no-therapy status quo, with some chance of autonomous
improvement or deterioration.) For example, surgery on the carotid
artery may prevent many fatal strokes but may also cause some strokes;
alternative therapies appear to risk less severe side effects but to be less
71
effective at preventing strokes.
Drinking water disinfection is an analogous example in the
regulatory law context: chlorination may prevent microbial disease but
may cause cancer, whereas alternatives like ozonation appear to be less
carcinogenic but also less effective at controlling waterborne
pathogens. 7 2 In both contexts, the decision problem is to choose which
intervention option yields the best expected outcome, based on the
probabilities of the various outcomes and the evaluative weights
73
assigned to the outcomes.
69 Id. at 257-259.

70 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 40.
71

See David B. Matchar, John Pauk & Joseph Lipscomb, A Health Policy

Perspective on Carotid Endarterectomy: Cost, Effectiveness, and Cost-Effectiveness,
in Surgery for Cerebrovascular Disease 680 (W. Moore, ed., 1996).
72 See Susan Putnam & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking Water, in
Graham & Wiener, supra note 6, at 124-148.
73 Medical schools apparently alert medical students to the fact that they will face
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Figure 2
Iatrogenesis and the Medical Decision Problem
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Adapted from Robert M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating
Q(uality-Adusted Life Years, in Valuing Health Care 31, 40 (Frank A.
Sloan, ed.1995).

Crucial to choosing among available therapeutics is the evaluation of
the importance of the side effects relative to the change in target
risk: 7 4 Given available options, the physician and patient must weigh
and judge the preferred combination of target and countervailing risk
these difficult choices, but may not train physicians to employ a formal, analytic
decision method to sort out these dilemmas in their daily practices. See Kaplan,
supra note 2, at 34 ("ultimately, clinicians make some general interpretations of the
[choice problem] by applying a weighting system [to the diverse outcomes].... [But
this] typically is done implicitly, arbitrarily, and in an idiosyncratic way."); Jerome P.
Kassirer, Our Stubborn Quest for Diagnostic Certainty: A Cause of Excessive
Testing, 320 N. Eng. J. Med. 1489 (1989) (doctors order too many diagnostic tests,
many of which are injurious to patients, because doctors are not taught to employ
quantitative comparisons of therapies and iatrogenic risks). The regulatory state may
not be preparing its caregivers much better.
74 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 33-34; Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 1112,29-36.
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inductions. 7 5 Alone, countervailing risk cannot be judged "significant"
or "unacceptable": Very risky surgery or radiation therapy might be
used to treat life-threatening brain tumors, but even minor nausea
might be intolerable in treating headaches. The choice also depends, of
course, on available alternatives.
Likewise, target risks cannot be deemed "significant" or
ccunacceptable" in the abstract, alone or by reference to bright-lines.
Acceptability depends on the relative importance of countervailing risks
that would arise from interventions. The choice of the best strategy to
combat a target risk depends on the relative effectiveness and relative
76
side effects of the available alternative approaches.
Thus, some form of comparative risk analysis is inescapable. What
makes it inevitable is not the issue that has received most attention:
ranking independent risks "worst things first" in order to allocate
control efforts to top-priority concerns. 7 7 That is a problem of
75 "The hazards inherent in modern hospital care make it imperative that the
physician weigh [iatrogenic] risk whenever hospitalization is considered and... again
each time a specific drug or procedure is ordered." McLamb & Huntley, supra note
29, at 4 72.
76 Thus, for example, Justice Stevens erred in his famous remark in the Benzene case

that "[s]ome risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable. If, for

example, the odds are one in a billion that a person will die from cancer by taking a
drink of chlorinated water, the risk dearly could not be considered significant. On the
other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors
that are two percent benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the
risk significant and take steps to decrease or eliminate it.' Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980).
The statement erred - in addition to slighting such issues as population risk, costs
of control, and qualitative attributes of risk - in its neglect of countervailing risks.
The countervailing risks of taking "steps" to reduce the target risk might render even a
high target risk (such as 10-3) "acceptable," and at the same time the absence of
countervailing risks might render even a small target risk (such as 10-9)
unacceptable." No risk is "plainly" acceptable or unacceptable (that is, judged on the
basis of the magnitude of the target risk alone); whether society should "accept" a
particular risk or not depends on what society would have to sacrifice to avoidthat

ris.

Cf. Baruch Fischoff et al., Acceptable Risk 3 (1981) (whether a risk is

"acceptable" is "inherently situation specific. That is, there are no universally

acceptable options (or risks...).").
77 See Comparing Environmental Risks (J. Clarence Davies, ed., 1996); Worst
Things First? The Debate Over Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities (Adam
M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, eds., 1994); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming
EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum.
L.Rev. 562 (1992); Frank B. Cross, Why Shouldn't We Regulate Worst Things
First?, 4 N.Y.U. Envtl L. J. 312 (1995). Ranking actions, rather than risks, would
address countervailing risks and would target recommendations to address the risks
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regulatory triage, of allocation and opportunity costs. What makes
comparative risk analysis truly inescapable is the distinct problem of
regulatory iatrogenesis.
That some comparison of target and countervailing risks is
inescapable does not require the use of a particular form of analysis; it
need not be formalized and quantitative, though quantification may
assist. There is no one-size-fits-all method; the degree of sophistication
in comparison should vary according to such factors as the stakes riding
on the choice (higher stakes may warrant more careful analysis) and the
costs of delaying the selection while performing the analysis (urgent
decisions may warrant less searching analysis).78
Countervailing risks does suggest that the use of "conservative
default assumptions" in quantitative risk assessment of the target risk
(e.g., using the most sensitive test animal or conservative animal-human
interspecies scaling factors) can be self-defeating. A main purpose
articulated for the use of conservative assumptions to address
uncertainty is to make risk policy "better safe than sorry" by
"reduc[ing] the probability of errors of underestimation" and thereby
encouraging "the prudent avoidance of unnecessary public health
risks."' 7 9 If more stringent regulation of target risk induces even greater
countervailing risks, then conservative default assumptions may yield
more rather than less overall risk. 8 0 If the goal is prudent avoidance, it
81
may make more sense to treat risks more evenhandedly.
that can be controlled most effectively at least cost. See John D. Graham & James K
Hammitt, Refining the CRA Framework, in Davies, supra note 77, at 93, 97-103.
78 See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
79 Adam M. Finkel, The Case for "Plausible Conservatism" in Choosing and
Altering Defaults, Appendix N-1 in Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 601,

603-607 (1994).
80

"Better safe than sorry" and the "Precautionary Principle" both err in addressing

only the problem that inaction can entail target risks, and in neglecting the problem
that action can entail countervailing risks. Cf. Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk

75-79 (1996) (pitfalls of "better safe than sorry"); Frank Cross, supra note 16, at 85658. Compare the medical context: if physicians used default assumptions that
systematically overestimated patients' ailments, and consequently prescribed more
and bolder therapy, the rate of iatrogenic injury would increase. (Critics might allege
that this is in fact what physicians do.) Patients might well prefer a more "prudent"

medical care regimen that considered both sets of risks on an evenhanded basis; so
might the wards of the regulatory state.
81 See Williams, supra note 18, at 1378-79. One might reply that both target risks
and countervailing risks could be estimated using conservative default assumptions,
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The comparison of target and countervailing risks is complicated,
among other things, by uncertainty in estimating the probabilities of
the various possible outcomes, and by the fact that risks come in diverse
qualitative forms and contexts, so that weighing a target risk versus a
82
countervailing risk is not a simple linear arithmetic calculation.
Among other attributes, the type of risk (e.g., acute injury vs. cancer)
may matter to people even if the quantitative likelihood of death is
equal. 8 3 The same challenges of comparison arise in public regulation.
"Expert" and "public" evaluations of risks may diverge, perhaps because
they bring different values to their conceptions of "risk,"8 4 and
perhaps because people (including patients, physicians, citizens and
regulators) may have a difficult time bringing a clear analytic
perspective to bear on risk choices (especially under the conditions of
mental stress that may accompany serious illnesses, intimidating
hospital settings, and public policy debates). 8 5 The response to these
difficulties cannot be to reject risk comparisons altogether, for there is
no way to avoid making some judgment. Not to compare is to
compare arbitrarily. Countervailing risks cannot be wished away. The
response must be to take better account of the quantitative, qualitative
86
and contextual differences among risks.
yielding parallel overestimations. In practice, the more typical "double standard" is to
treat target risks "as at least as bad as the most ephemeral evidence could support"
(i.e., to use quite conservative default assumptions) but to ignore countervailing risks
or to treat them as "only as serious as hard evidence can uncontrovertibly
demonstrate." Howard Margolis, Book Review, 15 J. Pol. Anal. & Mgmt. 685, 686
(1996). Parallel treatment would be some improvement. But systematically
overestimating all risks seems a weaker basis for policy, more prone to error and more
prone to inflaming public misunderstanding, than dealing with uncertainty on all sides
with a more equanimous approach.
82 See Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 32-34; Davies, supra note 76; Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L.Rev. 779 (1994).
83 See Valuing Health for Policy 341-342 (George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, &
Robert Fabian, eds. 1994) (reporting that given equal probabilities of death by acute
injury and by cancer, people say they would prefer death by acute injury to death by
cancer by about a factor of 2).
84 See KS. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991); Clayton Gilette &
James Krier, Risk, Courts, andAgencies, 138 U. Penn. L.Rev. 1027 (1990).
85 See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. Econ. Lit. 669 (1996);
Roger Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology or Risk
Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
86 See Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 32-33 (arguing that risk-risk
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Risk-SuperiorMoves
The medical context demonstrates that risk-risk dilemmas can be
eased by the development of new therapies which are both as or more
effective against the target ailment and less risky in terms of side
effects. These are "dominant" or "risk superior" 8 7 options, innovations
which escape the previous dilemma by reducing multiple risks in
concert. They can be depicted graphically as pressing outward from the
previous frontier of available risk protection portfolios (RPF2 in Figure
1). A countervailing risk worth tolerating today may be worth reducing
tomorrow given a risk-superior option; a dynamic system should create
incentives for continuous medical and regulatory improvements.
Surgery is a case in point. Surgery to correct fractured bones,
diseased organs and other exigent maladies raises at least two kinds of
countervailing risk: the pain of the surgical procedure itself, and the
latent infection that may take hold in the surgical wound. Pain during
surgery not only injures the patient but can disrupt the surgical
procedure, impeding the therapy for the target ailment. Nosocomial
(hospital-induced) infection can be disabling or fatal. In Great Britain in
the mid-1800s, for example, when amputations were frequently
employed to treat gangrene, severe fractures, and other limb problems,
25-60% of civilian amputations (and 75-90% of military amputations)
resulted in death by nosocomial infection. 8 8 That is, roughly half of
the surgeries killed the patient by exposing the open wound to
infection; the average patient undergoing a life-saving amputation faced
a mortality risk of roughly 1 in 4 to 1 in 2 from the subsequent
infection. This made for arduous choices.
The serendipitous development of anesthesia by nitrous oxide and
ether inhalation in the 184 0s enabled surgery without pain. 8 9 Joseph
comparison is inescapable and that the better route is toward better methods of

comparison, not a retreat to assertions of incommensurability); Williams, supra note
19, at 1378 (arguing that risk-risk comparisons may be more tractable than riskmoney comparisons, but that people make both kinds of comparisons every day).
87 See Graham & Wiener, supra note 16, at 36-41. In the "shower" example
above, supra note 45, risk-superior options to ease the tradeoff between body odor

and soap in the eye, dry skin, slipping in the tub might include, e.g., milder soaps and
bathmats.
88 Leo M. Zimmerman & Ilza Veith, Great Ideas in the History of Surgery 464
(Dover Publications, New York, 2d ed. 1967) (citing Sir Rickman John Godlee, Lord
Lister ( 3rd ed. 1924)).
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Lister's methodical development of antiseptics in the 1860s enabled
surgery with much less risk of infection. 9 0 Lister reported in 1870 that
the death rate from nosocomial infection in one hospital he studied fell
from 45% (within two years after amputation performed without
antiseptics) to 15% (within three years after amputation performed
with antiseptics).91 Lister's innovation was not quickly accepted in
London. Surgeons took umbrage at the notion that their own incisions
caused harm, and Lister's recommended antiseptic regimen was
"widely derided as finical, ladylike and affected." 9 2 Antisepsis was
more immediately adopted on the Continent and, roughly two
93
decades later, in England as well.
Nevertheless, both anesthesia and antisepsis illustrate the point that
there remain risk-risk choices along the higher risk protection frontier.'
9 4 And
Anesthesia risks heart failure and other adverse side effects.
89 ad at438,461.
90 Id. at 461, 464-466. Lister was among the first to see and address the connection
between contamination and nosocomial infection. In the 1840s, O. W. Holmes had
recognized the nosocomial source of puerperal fever, see supra note 25, and Ignaz
Philipp Semeiweiss had reduced the fatality rate among new mothers due to puerperal
fever from 18% to 1% by the then-revolutionary step of requiring hospital staff to
wash their hands in a disinfectant before delivering newborn babies. Richard Gordon,
The Alarming History of Medicine 67-68 (1993). Pasteur and Koch did not identify
microbes as the source of such infections until the 1860s. Id. at 18-22, 68.
91 Zimmerman & Veith, supra note 87, at 466, citing 2 The Collected Papers of
Joseph, Baron Lister 129 (1909).
92 Gordon, supra note 89, at 56. Even in the 1960s, despite "an overwhelming
number of references" to iatrogenic disease in the medical literature and "a constant
barrage of warning letters from pharmaceutical companies and the FDA," observers
lamented that "most physicians appear to feel secure in the belief, that 'iatrogenic
disease' is a consequence of carelessness or ineptitude on the part of some other
physician." Beaty & Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 641.
9 The resistance in England persisted for twenty years, until "many of the senior
members of the profession had been replaced by a younger and more malleable
generation." Zimmerman & Veith, supra note 87, at 466. This instantiates Max
Planck's lament that "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it." Max Planck, Scientific
Autobiography and Other Papers 33-34 (F. Gaynor, tr., 1949), quoted in Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 151 (2nd ed. 1970).
94 See Brown, supra note 1. Early attempts at anesthesia by chloroform often
killed the patient. See Gordon, supra note 89, at 86. But an alternative, ether, caused
vomiting and was flammable, id at 83, 87. Both were ultimately replaced by risksuperior anesthetics, such as narcotics (which still pose their own risks). Today the
search continues; in the 1980s, the Harvard hospitals installed alarms on monitoring
devices to alert anesthesiologists to patients' breathing problems. This move both
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Lister recognized that caustic antiseptic wound dressings not only kill
invading bacteria but also injure the patient's own tissues, impairing the
body's own defense mechanisms. He therefore experimented for two
decades with various compounds and spraying methods to try to
95
maximize its effectiveness and minimize its own iatrogenic effect.
One response to this dilemma of antiseptic dressings was the innovation
of aseptic surgery, in which tools and materials are heat-sterilized in
96
advance - another move to a higher protection frontier.
Numerous other examples of risk-superior innovations in medicine
can be cited. The combination of estrogen and progestin, and a new
drug called raloxifene, were developed to mitigate the iatrogenic cancer
risks of estrogen alone. 9 7 Vaccines prevent epidemics, but can
themselves induce some individuals to contract the disease; Edward
Jenner's smallpox vaccine was made compulsory in England in 1853,
but voluntary again in 1948 when it turned out that the vaccine was
causing more cases of smallpox than was the virtually extinct virus
itself. 9 8 Recognizing this risk-risk tradeoff, new risk-superior vaccines
are being designed to minimize their iatrogenic risks. 9 9
In short, the history of medicine has been a search for risk-superior
innovations. Iatrogenic risk is not just a pesky nuisance of medical
treatment, or an insult to the profession; it is a motivating force in
developing new and better treatments. Countervailing risks of risk
reduced patient fatalities due to anesthesia and saved the hospitals significant
expenses. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 42, at 411-13.
95 See Zimmerman & Veith, supra note 87, at 468. This risk-risk tradeoff is
reminiscent of the oil spill cleanup problem mentioned above, supra note 8: Hot
water spraying not only cleans off the oil, but also injures aquatic microbes, in turn
impairing the ecosystem's ability to dean itself and to recover from the oil.
6 Id. at 467. Aseptic and antiseptic surgery, and low rates of nosocomial infection,
are the norm in modern American hospitals, but lax attention to aseptic and antiseptic
can still generate significant increases in infection rates today. See Weiler,
protocols
et al., supra note 3, at 58 (1993); see also Beaty & Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 645
("latrogenic disease not infrequently presents in the form of infections" resulting from
contamination of implements, superinfection due to large doses of antibiotics, and
suppressed immune response due to cancer chemotherapy).
97 See Hatziandreu et al., supra note 23, at 46; Jane E. Brody, Study Finds a New
Estrogen Offers Benefit Without Risk, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1997, p. A19 (reporting
that raloxifene "can strengthen bones... without fostering cancers").
98 See Gordon, supra note 89, at 50-51. In 1971 routine vaccinations for smallpox

were discontinued in England; in 1977 the virus was deemed eradicated. Id.
99 See, e.g., New Whooping Cough Vaccine Is Said to Eliminate Side Effects,

New York Times, Nov. 25, 1994, at A20.
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regulation should be similarly regarded, not as an annoyance or
ignominy but as the spur that drives regulatory innovation.
Risk-superior innovations are not magic bullets. First, there is a cost
in putting social resources into development of risk-superior
innovations. But innovation can yield larger net benefits than
incremental steps to address target and countervailing risks separately.
For example, the combination of pre-Listerian surgery and follow-on
treatment for wound infections was quite cost-ineffective compared to
antiseptic surgery. Strategic investments in risk-superior innovations can
be "risk-profitable," and actors facing appropriate incentives to take
account of countervailing risks can be expected to invest strategically in
such moves. Second, moving to a higher RPF is not an escape from
tradeoffs; a risk-risk dilemma will eventually arise again, as new
alternatives to the new therapy are introduced with different target and
countervailing risk outcomes, and perhaps as new countervailing risks
are discovered to be arising from the innovative therapy.
Expansion and Optimization
Expansion. The medical care context suggests that the risk
regulation regime might face pressure to expand in response to
countervailing risks. In this scenario, the therapeutic path actually taken
in response to iatrogenesis involves follow-on treatments for each new
symptom in a cascade of countervailing risks resulting from a prior
therapies. In response to each iatrogenic injury, medical care may thus
generate an expanding web of specialists; each countervailing risk may
become a target risk for the next medical specialty. Surgery causes pain,
which warrants anesthesia, but anesthesia risks heart failure, which
increases the demand for cardiologists. Surgery causes infection, which
can be prevented with antiseptics, but antiseptics can impair the body's
own defenses. And antibiotics treat infection, but may also generate
toxic reactions, superinfections, or populations of resistant bacteria that
spawn new illnesses. 10 0 (See figure 3.)

100 See Beaty & Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 642-648 (toxic reactions and
superinfections induced by antibiotics); see supra note 64 (overuse of antibiotics

spawns resistant new strains of bacteria).
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Figure 3
latrogenesis and the Expanding Protective Regime
Illness/Injury

Surgery
Pain
Infection
Anesthiesia
I
Heart failure

/I\
Antiseptics Aseptics
I
Tissue damage

Cardiology

Antibiotics

Toxic reaction

Resistance,
Infection

An analogous dynamic may be at work in the regulatory state:
Initial laws generate countervailing risks, which create demand for new
laws; the bureaucracy spawns its own proliferation. Enactment of NEPA
was a response to the adverse environmental effects of government
projects; the enactment of RCRA was in part a response to the rising
tide of solid waste generated by compliance with the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts. Worse is a potential vicious circle. Deliberation costs
induce regulatory politics to fragment decisionmaking into specialized
agents. Specialization yields adverse effects outside the decisionmaker's
domain. This fosters the proliferation of new institutions to deal with
the countervailing risks of the first interventions. Proliferation increases
the number of regulatory actors, which increases the deliberation costs
of shaping comprehensive, collective solutions. The pressure for
additional countervailing risks is thus embedded in the response to
initial risks. The rate of expansion would depend in part on the costs of
deliberation and the ease of fragmentation; high deliberation costs and
easy fragmentation could entail worsening side effects and accelerating
expansion. (To be sure, there are constraining forces as well, e.g, the
budget costs of creating new agencies and the industry lobby against
new regulation. Even if the expansion hypothesis has empirical merit, it
does not indicate a normatively desirable reach of the regulatory state.)
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Optimization. What is the optimal scope of risk regulation in the
face of countervailing risks? The process of treating (regulating) the
target risk and adding follow-on treatments (additional regulations) for
the countervailing side effect may be worthwhile, if each step yields net
gains. Not regulating the target risk (to avoid the countervailing risk)
could be more worrisome than regulating and incurring the side effects
of regulation. This suggests that the optimal scale of the regulatory
state, in light of countervailing risks, could be "larger." On the other
as
hand, follow-on regulations might not reduce overall risk as much
1 0 1 If
worse.
matters
make
would less initial regulation; they might even
so the optimal response might be to advocate reining in the risk
regulation regime - a "smaller" optimal regulatory state. In the short
term, this might make sense: If the side effects are severe, one may
prefer fewer and less aggressive interventions - e.g. less surgery,
depowered airbags, slower police chases - even though the target
ailment would thereby remain somewhat more worrisome. In the long
term, neither an expanding web of follow-on regulations to address
countervailing risks, nor a retreat from target risks, seems ideal, if
intelligent risk-superior options are available. And the scalar suggestion
of a "larger" or "smaller" regulatory state is distracting or misleading;
the more important issue is the design of "smarter" regulations.
At a first approximation, just as optimal medical treatment would
maximize the difference between the expected gain and the expected
side effect (see Figure 2), optimal risk regulation would maximize the
the
difference between the reduction in the target risk (ATR) and
102
max(ATR-ACR).
is,
increase in countervailing risks (ACR), that
This optimizing condition does not correspond to the adages
typically invoked to deal with adverse side effects. The Hippocratic
Oath teaches physicians "Primum Non Nocere" or "First of all, Do No
Harm," and that prescription has also been suggested as a helpful
101 "[I]n an effort to extricate himself from complications of diagnosis and therapy,
the physician may compound the problem by having to employ maneuvers that are in
themselves risky." Beaty & Petersdorf, supra note 4, at 655.
102 For ease of exposition, I usesimple notation here and abstract from the realities
that risks are qualitatively diverse and are estimated with uncertainty. I also frequently
use the change in the risk (A) rather than marginal analysis, for ease of accessibility to
multidisciplinary readers. The values of ATR and ACR should be understood here as
absolute values.
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general aspiration for sound risk regulation. 10 3 But if enforced as a
formal criterion, this adage would be overkill: it would require zero
countervailing risks even where tolerating an increment of
countervailing risk would enable society to make much greater gains
against a target risk. Regulatory options with ACR = 0 might have low
(ATR-ACR), compared to other options with positive ACR but much
larger ATR. If countervailing risks are truly omnipresent, no regulatory
option can ever truly "do no harm." Plainly, physicians and patients do
not adhere to the strict letter of "Do No Harm" - and neither should
10 4
regulatory agencies.
The contrasting prescription is to "ignore side effects." This was the
gist of Lindblom's famous advice to "muddle through:" he specifically
urged that regulatory agencies avoid "comprehensive" analysis in which
every important relevant factor is taken into account," and instead take
an incrementalist approach in which "analysis is drastically limited" and
"important possible outcomes are neglected." 1 0 5 Lindblom added that
the practice of "ignoring important possible consequences" might seem
"a shocking shortcoming" but that it was superior to "futile attempts to
achieve a comprehensiveness beyond human capacity." 1 0 6 He argued
103 See Dale Hattis, Drawing the Line: Quantitative Criteria for Risk
Management, 38 Environment (July-Aug. 1996). Cf John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 114 (1971) (recommending "do no harm" as a duty all persons owe each
other). Models of unanimous decisionmaking and full Pareto-optimality require that
policy do no (uncompensated) harm to anyone. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II
38, 385 (1989) (describing unanimity/universal gain postulates of Knut Wicksell and
Wilfredo Pareto).
104 See Christopher H. Schroeder. Rights Against Risk, 86 Columbia L.Rev. 495,
495, 555 (1986) (arguing that while "do no harm" may be a worthy aspiration, justice
does not require absolute zero harm to others); Jonathan Baron, Blind Justice:
Fairness to Groups and the Do-No-Harm Principle, 8 J. Behav. Decision Making 71
(1995) (seeking zero side effects can yield unjustifiable judgments that increase overall
harm); Mueller, supra note 103, at 400-407 (describing Amartya Sen's theorem that
full Pareto-optimality [no harm to anyone s utility] is an impossible decisionmaking
rule, necessitating resort to some overriding principle such as tyranny or liberal
tolerance, or necessitating resort to interpersonal utility comparisons that let some be
hurt for the greater benefit of others). Cf James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent 63-84 (1962) (arguing that moving toward unanimity reduces
harm to others but increases decisionmaking costs, so that optimal social policy
employs non-unanimous voting and hence allows some harm to others).
105 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, 19 Public Admin.
Rev. 79, 81 (1959).
106 Id. at 85. His objection is that deliberation about countervailing risks is costly. I
address the issue of deliberation cost below, and show that Lindblom's recipe is
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that other agencies would address the adverse side effects of each
agency's actions, in a "division of labor [in which] every important
10 7
interest or value has its watchdog."
But ignoring countervailing risks is plainly suboptimal; those can
outweigh the gains in target risk reduction (ACR > ATR, or ATR-ACR
< 0). Lindblom's confidence that every interest will be represented in a
fragmented but coordinated regulatory system is misplaced; the costs
of information flow across agencies; more fundamentally, the costs of
political organization ensure that many interests (especially the diffuse
interests of the public, and the interests of disenfranchised groups such
as minorities) are omitted from the debate. 1 0 8 In that context, "Ignore
Side Effects" is tantamount to a license to "Do Infinite Harm," at least
to those whose interests are unrepresented in regulatory politics. For
both reasons of efficiency and equity, neither physicians nor agencies
should tolerate countervailing risks blithely.
Between "doing no harm" and "ignoring all harm" is a far better
middle ground. A variant of the Hippocratic Oath is the proposal that
regulations must do "more good than harm" 10 9 - i.e., a requirement
that ATR > ACR, or ATR-ACR > 0. This condition is necessary but
not sufficient. It precludes truly irrational choices, but it gives no
guidance in selecting the best option from among the subset of options
that all do more good than harm (for all of which ATR > ACR).
suboptimal whenever the error cost of ignoring a CR outweighs the deliberation cost
of addressing the CR.
107 Id. Lindblom asserted that this "system often can assure a more comprehensive
regard for the values of the whole society than any attempt at intellectual
comprehensiveness.... [A] high degree of administrative coordination occurs as each
agency adjusts its policies to the concerns of other agencies in the process of
fragmented decisionmaking." Id. at 85-86.
108 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 230-33 (discussing "omitted voice as
a cause of countervailing risks); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971) (collective organization is costly, biasing
public policy in favor of small groups with concentrated interests); Colin S. Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L.Rev. 393, 423-425, 432,
434 (1981) (Lindblom's view is dubious in light of collective action problems and
consequent political distortions); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 Va. L.Rev. 275
(1988) (costs of political voice skew policies away from diffuse general interests).
109 See e.g., Warren & Marchant, supra note 16; Sunstein, supra note 16, at 314
("Agencies generally ought to be required to show that they are doing more good
than harm.").
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Thus, in this first approximation, an optimal policy would
maximize the difference between the two risks (i.e., max(ATR ACR)). 1 1 0 This implies a key point: ACR matters even if it does not
exceed ATR - i.e., even if the regulation yields "more good than
harm" - because even a small ACR diminishes the overall net benefits,
thereby making alternative interventions with higher overall net benefits
relatively more attractive. The best policy, A, is the one with the
maximum overall net benefit - the one for which (ATR-ACR)A >
(ATR-ACR)B, where B represents every reasonable alternative to A.
And whenever the social opportunity cost of the intervention resources diverted from other productive endeavors - is not zero, the
condition for optimality must be to maximize (ATR - ACR - social
costs), or set marginal overall benefits (combining TR and CR) equal to
marginal social costs. Even a modest ACR (much smaller than ATR)
may still exceed the difference between ATR and social cost, yielding
negative net overall benefits for that policy. (I.e., it is easily possible for
it to be true that ATR > ACR but also true that ACR > (ATR - costs),
or ATR - ACR - costs < 0.)
A second approximation is necessary to account for deliberation
costs. It was argued above that regulators specialize and neglect adverse
side effects partly because it is costly in money and time to consider
and manage those side effects - and could mean a period of inaction
against target risks.1 1 1 Lindblom's fear that seeking comprehensiveness
would entail high administrative costs deserves respect, even if ignoring
side effects is an overreaction. 1 1 2 The tradeoff between ATR and ACR
can be posed as balancing the cost of incorporating ACR into policy
reformulation (deliberation cost) against the cost of ignoring ACR and
making a decision which thereby generates ACR (error cost). Optimal
110 Or, in marginal terms, intervene up to the point that the marginal increase in CR
equals the marginal reduction in TR.
111 Or a period of overregulation, depending on the default rule undergirding the
regulation. That is, if the default rule is no licensing of a product or project until the
regulation has been fully analyzed (as under pre-approval requirements for drugs
subject to the FFDCA, pesticides subject to FIFRA, and federal projects subject to
NEPA), delay to consider the countervailing risks may mean overregulation.
112 See Diver, supra note 106, at 428; Cross, supra note 16, at 922; Donald T.
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigmsand Politics
of Environmental Law Reform, 10 Yale J. Reg. 369, 386 (1993) (warning against
supersynopticism").
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regulatory policy would minimize the sum of deliberation costs and
error costs. 1 1 3 Equivalently, optimal policy would address countervailing side effects up to the point that the next unit of resources would
be better spent on another pursuit (e.g., addressing other risks) - it
would reduce countervailing risks to the point that the marginal
deliberation cost rises to equal the marginal benefit in reduced
countervailing risk (i.e., reduced policy errors).
The same point can be described as an "optimal stopping problem"
in determining the efficient amount of additional information to obtain
for decisionmaking. The problem is to balance the decision-improving
value of additional information (VOI) about the countervailing risk
against the costs of gathering and incorporating that information (COI
the foregone opportunities to devote that time and effort to other
problems). In concrete terms, it reflects the question of how far agencies
and their reviewers (chiefly OMB and courts) should go in analyzing
114
consequences before promulgating a regulation.
In conceptual terms, however, the optimal information problem
confronts two analytic difficulties. First, estimating the VOI for each
next side effect requires estimating what those side effects would be,
which in turn necessitates expending the COI (or a portion of the COI
on a best guess). Some deliberation is necessary to estimate the error
113 See Anthony I. Ogus, Information, Error Costs and Regulation, 12 Int'l Rev. of

Law & Econ. 411, 416 (1992) ("to increase social welfare the legal system should aim
at minimizing the sum of information costs and error costs"); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making, 3 J. Legal Studies 257 (1974)
(similar); Herbert A. Simon, On How to Decide What to Do, 9 Bell J. Econ. 494,
495 (1978) ("the least-cost or best-return decision [requires] a tradeoff between the
marginal computational cost and the marginal improvement in the substantive
decision it is expected to produce"); Ejan Mackaay, Economics of Information and
Law 110 (1982) (similar). Cf Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 104 (the optimal
voting rule minimizes the sum of incompleteness costs and decisionmaking costs).
Cass Sunstein has called this insight "the central contribution of economics to law."
Remarks at Federalist Society conference, Duke University, Mar. 1, 1997.
114 See, e.g., Gas Appliance Manufacturers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Energy,
998 F.2d 1041, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remanding to agency to obtain more

information prior to setting mandatory appliance performance standards, with
instructions to "consider the costs and benefits of testing options, taking into account
the importance of the [performance] hypothesis [to the regulatory decision], its
uncertainty, the likelihood that testing would resolve the uncertainty [i.e., reduce
policy errors], and the cost of testing. While of course we would defer to any reasoned
decision [by the agency] on incremental testing, here we cannot discern even the
faintest glimmer of an effort to make such a decision [about the optimal degree of
additional information to gather].").
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cost of not deliberating. If the net effect of the regulation is the
summation of an expansion series of n terms, with each term
representing the next-order effects, then the paradox is that in order to
know whether to analyze the nth term one must balance the
deliberation cost of that analysis against the error cost (i.e., the cost of
ignoring the nth term), but in order to estimate the error cost of
ignoring the nth term one must already have analyzed the nth term to
know its magnitude. Intuitive truncation points are elusive: deliberation
costs may rise substantially even as the error cost of ignoring the next
term declines, because a small countervailing effect may nonetheless be
quite difficult to investigate and calculate. And error costs may not
decline as the expansion series grows, because in a world of complex
interrelated systems, the nth-order effects may well be larger than the
2d- or 3d-order (or even 1st-order) effects.
A partial solution to the problem just described is to construct a
probability distribution of the possible values of information that might
be discovered, and use the "expected VOI' to decide ex ante. Still, this
necessitates some notion of the VOI probability distribution, which
implies some COL
The second difficulty is deeper. Incorporating deliberation cost is
complex because adding deliberation cost to the optimization model,
as described above, means constructing a more complex model - with
added deliberation costs of its own. We are now required not only to
optimize the original choice, including the costs of deliberating about
it, but also to optimize how much deliberation to put into the question
of how much to deliberate about the original choice, and so on.
Recursive deliberation about deliberation yields an infinite regress with
no mathematically precise solution. 1 15
115 See Conlisk, supra note 84, at 682-683, 686-688. As a default approach,
Conlisk suggests stopping at the second-order optimization problem, that is, optimize

the choice given deliberation costs, but ignore the deliberation cost of solving this
more complex model. Id. at 688. Cf.R. B. McKenzie, On the Methodological
Boundaries of Economic Analysis, 12 J. Econ. Issues 627, 634-635 (1978) (quoted in
Mackaay, supra note 113, at 112-113 & 237 n.56) (seeing an infinite regress in

information economics because in order to optimize, one needs information, which
requires optimizing how much information to use, which requires information, ad
infnitum; "At some point, the individual must assert in some noncalculating way how
he will use resources to establish what he wants: He must, in effect, take a stab in the
dark...").

Wiener: Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management 75

Institutional Progress. Perfection may be illusory, but improved
decisionmaking is not impossible. The "optimal stopping problem" and
its informational paradox confront us every day when we have to
decide whether to buy something or continue comparison shopping; or
whether to read the next page of the newspaper, or instead do
something else. Dealing with these choices requires exercising judgment
about potential next-order consequences and the associated deliberation
costs. Institutional rather than mathematical solutions to the paradox
seem most promising. For example, agencies and the White House
could experiment with stages of risk analysis to help illuminate whether
initial suppositions about the importance of, and costs of estimating,
next-order effects are good or poor predictors of the value and costs of
full-blown analysis.
More generally, the institutional solution to the paradox of recursive
deliberation can draw on the analysis of the related problem in
regulating market externalities (target risks). In a world of real
transaction costs, and of uncertainty about which private party is the
least-cost harm avoider, the most efficient allocation of entitlements
may be approached by assigning liability for harm to the party with the
1 16
lowest transaction costs of reallocation to the true least-cost avoider.
Similarly, in a world of real deliberation costs and of uncertainty about
which regulatory entity is the least-cost avoider of errors (countervailing
risks), the most efficient result may be approached by assigning
policymaking responsibility to the regulatory institution with the lowest
deliberation costs of addressing and managing such potential errors.
This suggests that for regulatory contexts in which countervailing risks
are worrisome, policy choices should usually be handled by institutions
designed to deliberate cost-effectively (and that institutions which must
deal with risk policy should be renovated to reduce deliberation costs).
It is hard to find examples of policy institutions that exhibit low
deliberation costs. Legislatures typically lack analytic infrastructure
(and of late the Congress has been dismantling what it has), 1 1 7 and
116 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L.Rev. 1089, 1096-1097

(1972); Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 135-73 (1970).
117 The 104th Congress abolished the Office of Technology Assessment and the

Administrative Conference of the United States, two of its main sources of analysis of
regulatory policy.
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courts incur high deliberation costs (in the form of other cases crowded
out of court) when they investigate complex regulatory matters.
Regulatory agencies are an analytic infrastructure poised to deliberate,
but as argued above, the fragmentation of the regulatory state yields
high costs of deliberating about side effects. Perhaps greater attention
to countervailing risks will motivate improvements in regulatory
institutions to reduce deliberation costs, just as attention to iatrogenic
injury has motivated improvements in hospitals' oversight and
information sharing systems.
Regulatory institutions with low deliberation costs still need to be
guided to consider side effects appropriately. Clearly decisionmakers
should not try to consider all the infinitely possible side effects of an
intervention; they cannot know all the ripples throughout the system
(especially given that the "system" has no objective boundaries, but is
defined by the scope of the relevant next-order consequences, and more
precisely because the deliberation costs of trying to know all the ripples
would rise rapidly). Neither should decisionmakers consider none of
the side effects, thereby ignoring the costs of errors. Between
supersynopticism and blind incrementalism is the pragmatic middle
ground which minimizes the costs of each. 118 Risk managers should
engage in reasonable consideration of the side effects1 19 consideration which maximizes its net benefits by minimizing the sum
of the costs of deliberation and the costs of errors. Thus, Executive
Orders, Congressional statutes and reviewing courts should neither
ignore countervailing risks nor mandate endless analysis of
countervailing risks; they should require agencies to make a judgment
about the reasonable degree of attention and redress to be given to
regulatory side effects.
Recent legal developments have begun to move in this direction.
President Clinton's Executive Order on Regulatory Review requires
agencies to include in their benefit-cost analysis of each regulation the
118 See Diver, supra note 107, at 429-430 ("The solution to synoptic failures is not
a blind retreat to incrementalism. What is needed is a sense of balance.... We need

not cast all our weight on one side, for incrementalism and comprehensive rationality
each offer unique advantages as well as conspicuous limitations.").
119 This deliberative exercise should take appropriate account of the qualitative and
contextual aspects of risk. See Jonathon Baert Wiener, Risk in the Republic, 8 Duke

Envd. Law & Policy Forum 1 (1997).
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"adverse effects [of the proposed regulation] on... health, safety and the
natural environment." 12 0 This requirement is subject to the general
instruction to "base... decisions on the best reasonably obtainable
scientific, technical, economic, and other information concerning the
need for, and consequences of, the intended regulation." 12 1 The
"regulatory reform" bill that passed the House but not the Senate in the
104th Congress would have required agencies, among other things, to
evaluate the "significant substitution risks" generated by new agency
regulations. 1 2 2 The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996
(passed 98-0 by the Senate and 392-30 by the House) provide that EPA
may depart from the ordinarily required "maximum feasible" control
level if the maximum feasible control on one contaminant would
generate countervailing increases in other health risks, and that EPA
may in such circumstances set drinking water standards to "minimize
the overall risk of adverse health effects by balancing the [target and
countervailing risks]." 12 3 Recent case law also implied that the bar on
"arbitrary and capricious" rulemaking in the Administrative Procedures
124
Act may require agencies to confront countervailing risks.
Ultimately, the effort to maximize the difference between ATR
and ACR will succeed partly by designing institutions that reduce
deliberation and error costs, and partly by stimulating innovative risksuperior methods that enable both target and countervailing risks to be
120 E.O. 12866, Sept. 30, 1993, §6(a)(3)(C). No such item on countervailing risk was
enumerated in President Reagan's E.O. 12291. (As a member of the senior staff at the
Council of Economic Advisers in 1993, I assisted in the drafting of this and other
provisions of EO 12866.)
121 Id. §1(b)(7).
122 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., §§105(4), 110(4). The term "significant" seems to
direct the agency to calibrate its analysis to the seriousness (error cost) of each
substitution risk, but might not account for the difficulty of analysis (deliberation
cost) of each substitution risk.
123 42 USC 1412(b)(5) (1996).
124 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d 1201; Competitive Enterprise
Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Analogizing from the medical
arena, courts might also impose tort liability for "regulatory malpractice," ideally as
"enterprise liability" inducing the regulatory state as a whole to adopt systematic
safeguards against countervailing risks. Cf Abraham & Weiler, supra note 42
(advocating medical enterprise liability); Havighurst, supra note 41 (same). But such
a move could yield overdeterrence of worthwhile regulation, in part because, unlike
physicians, public agencies do not earn financial rewards for their target risk reduction

services. Moreover, because courts have high deliberation costs, the first resort should
be to more integrated analysis in the Executive Branch rather than to litigation.
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addressed more effectively. Joseph Lister sought not only the optimal
level of surgeries given a fixed risk of nosocomial infection, but new
ways to make surgery a more attractive therapy by reducing the
countervailing risk. Similar innovation is occurring all the time in
medicine. The ideal resolution to regulatory side effects may be not
more or less regulation, but new ways to mitigate countervailing risks
and thereby to make risk regulation a less caustic and more appealing
tool. And it will involve structural integration of risk regulation
institutions to remedy the fragmented decisionmaking now rampant in
the regulatory state, both among Executive agencies 12 5 and among
Congressional committees. 126 Just as hospitals are moving to a more
integrated model that connects medical specialties through a common
dispatch and monitoring system, the regulatory state should create
structures to "treat the whole patient" rather than attacking one
symptom or subsystem at a time. These structures should include
interagency working groups with greater authority to manage multiple
risks in concert, a supervisory "primary risk manager" for the entire
regulatory state, an integrated Congressional committee on risk, and an
integrated statutory framework on risk.
Toward a Risk-Superior Regulatory State
If a central challenge of medicine is to manage iatrogenic threats, a
central challenge of risk management is to deal with the iatrogenic
impacts of our regulatory regime. But we should not attempt to do so
based only on anecdotal and impressionistic accounts, like the list of
conjectural examples proffered at the outset of this article. We need a
careful study of regulatory iatrogenesis and remedies, in the tradition
of Joseph Lister's studies of nosocomial infection and the Harvard
Medical Practice Study of New York hospitals. Also, more than just a
study of the adverse outcomes of risk regulation, we need studies on
all outcomes, both beneficial and adverse, to both human and
ecological health. This enterprise might be launched by a federal
Commission on Risk Outcomes and Management, or by a White
125 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 252-260.
126 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 250-251; Sunstein, supra note 16, at
314.
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House office, or by an academic group. We need an ongoing
monitoring system to generate a series of health and environmental
outcomes data, on both target risk reductions and countervailing risk
increases, akin to the varied and detailed data series collected on the
performance of the financial economy. 12 7 And we need a science of
"risk management epidemiology" to link these risk outcomes to
explanatory factors in social, economic, and regulatory choices.
The medical model of iatrogenic effects suggests that countervailing risks are pervasive and can be studied analytically and
12 8
empirically. It suggests that such risks are not inherent in technology
nor in economic activity, 1 2 9 but arise from the limitations of
institutional design and the costs of regulatory deliberation. It suggests
that we should not blame the physician or the regulator, but rather that
we should empathize with the exceedingly difficult choices that all
decisionmakers must make when confronting risk-risk tradeoffs - and
demand better. We should find institutional arrangements that reduce
deliberation costs and error costs, and encourage and reward integrated
analysis and synergistic approaches.
Concern about countervailing risks is warranted whether one views
the regulatory state as a limited guarantor of private liberties, a
scientific social adjuster, or a proactive parental caretaker. Risk
management requires judgment and compassion - compassion not
only for the victims of target risks who capture today's headlines, but
also for the victims of the countervailing risks, particularly likely to be
underrepresented in the hubbub of regulatory politics. 1 3 0 From this
vantage, the politically divergent movements for "regulatory reform"
and "environmental justice" share a common basis in concern about
127 See Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, Scientific American 40-

47 (May 1993).
128 See Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of
Unintended Consequences (1996) (emphasizing inherent technological causes).
129 See Viscusi, supra note 44, at 1448-1455 (emphasizing substitution effects,
behavioral "lulling," the risks of compliance and cleanup activities, and income losses
as the main causes of risks induced by regulation).
130 Not every countervailing risk afflicts disenfranchised minorities, but the
connection is important; it is in large part the weak political influence of both
disenfranchised groups and the diffuse general public that renders their interests
secondary to the target risks put on the political agenda by better organized factions.
See Wiener & Graham, supra note 22, at 230-233; Diver, supra note 106, at 432,
434.
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countervailing risks. Better addressing countervailing risks would
improve both the efficiency and fairness of our risk management
system. Indeed, good government may have a particular responsibility
to make up for political distortions by showing special concern for the
involuntary victims of countervailing risks. Consider the case of
passenger-side automobile airbags: although they save more adults each
year than they kill children, the children who have been killed by
airbags can be seen as involuntary innocents with no political voice,
while the adults saved are often unbelted voluntary risk-takers with
choice in markets and potential voice in politics. 1 3 1 Much the same
might be said of the victims of police chase crashes or environmental
injustice.
Advocates of risk regulation should care about preventing
countervailing risks for a strategic reason, whether or not they feel
compassion for the victims of countervailing risks. If countervailing risks
are left unaddressed, they may undermine public support for the
regulatory state. Neglecting CRs can breed resentment and distrust of
the entire regulatory regime, undermining its legitimacy and inviting a
13 2
clumsy backlash against protective regulation.
131 Since 1986, passenger-side airbags in the U.S. appear to have saved 332 passengers

who would otherwise have died - but also killed 52 who would otherwise have
survived, of whom 49 were children. (Driver-side airbags apparently saved 2,288
drivers but killed 35.) See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Agency to Permit On-Off
Switches for Car Airbags, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1997, p.A1 (reporting latest U.S.
Department of Transportation data). On balance the fatality risk for children in the
front seat is increased 21 to 88% by installing a passenger-side airbag. John D.
Graham et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Airbags by Seating Position, 278 JAMA
1418, 1421 (1997). Because passenger-side airbags have saved several times as many
adult passengers as children killed, at first glance it seems that ATR > ACR ("more
good than harm"). But the years of life lost are higher when children die than when
adults die, so the countervailing risk is higher on a life-years lost basis than on a lives
lost basis. And perhaps society could maximize ATR - ACR by reducing the CR
further. Moreover, the CR afflicts involuntary innocents: 12 of the children killed
were babies in rear-facing infant seats placed in the front passenger seat (despite
product warnings not to do so), see Wald, supra. And perhaps 2 of the older
children killed were properly restrained in the front seat with seatbelts, compare
Wald, supra (none of the children killed were properly belted) with John D. Graham
& Maria Segui-Gomez, Airbags: Benefits and Risks, 5 Risk in Perspective no. 7
(Harvard Ctr. for Risk Anal., July 1997), at 2 (at least two of the children killed were
properly belted). Even unbelted older children may be involuntary victims of airbag
risks (e.g. if placed injeopardy by their parents). Of course, even adult passengers
may not be wholly voluntary" risk-takers (e.g. if poorly informed).
132 Senator Moynihan has made a similar point about welfare reform: "'whenever the
critics said, correctly, that the welfare system was doing more harm than good, and
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The medical model illustrates the institutional pressure for risk
management systems to grow larger, more complex and more
uncoordinated as they respond piecemeal and reactively to the side
effects of prior piecemeal interventions. But the implication that
optimality requires "less" medicine or regulation is unsatisfying. The
optimal long-term solution to nosocomial infection from surgery is
neither less surgery, nor more post-operative treatment for infections
(though both of those made sense before antiseptics), but rather a new
way of performing surgery that mitigates the risk of infection, such as
Joseph Lister's. As discussed above, simple innovations such as washing
hands before surgery, installing breathing monitors and alarms to alert
anesthesiologists, and sharing information across the hospital, can prove
to be dramatically "risk-superior." Similarly, the optimal long-term
solution to countervailing risks of regulation is unlikely to be "less" or
"more" regulation neither, for example, a less powerful or
deactivated airbag that spares children while sacrificing adults, 1 3 3 nor
additional regulations prohibiting children from the front seat 134
(though each of these may make sense in the short term). It is rather a
set of "smarter" information flows, analytic requirements and
bureaucratic reward structures that stimulate creative, innovative and
tailored "risk superior" interventions that reduce multiple risks in
concert - such as a "smart" airbag which senses the speed of the
collision or whether the occupant is belted or not (or even the
occupant's stature) and adjusts the deployment threshold and force
accordingly.135
suggested that it be rethought, its defenders screamed 'racism' and 'slavefare.' They
did that until there was no public support left at all. Now they are stunned at what
they are getting'" in the 1996 welfare reform law, which Moynihan viewed as
"'approaching an Apocalypse.'" R.W. Apple, Jr., A Democrat: His Battle Now Lost,
Moynihan Still Cries Out, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1996, at A10. Likewise, neglecting

countervailing risks may be an invitation to overblown "deregulatory" legislation.

133 See Janet L. Fix, New Airbags Safer for Kids, Riskier for Adults, Atlanta J.
Const., Mar. 15, 1997, p.A1 (discussing "depowered" airbags).
134 France and Germany have until recently required children under a certain age (10
or 12 years) to sit in the back seat. Children have lower fatality rates in the back seat
than in the front seat, even without counting fatalities from passenger-side airbags in
front. See Graham et al., supra note 131, at 1424.
135 A smart airbag which raises the deployment threshold when the occupant is
belted is available in some Mercedes-Benz automobiles. See Jayne O'Donnell &
James R. Healey, Should Air Bags Deploy in Low-Speed Collisions?, USA Today,
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The optimal path is toward a set of "smarter" institutions. Optimal
regulatory arrangements will involve more coordinated, holistic
regulatory approaches that "treat the whole patient" from the outset.
They will involve new institutional structures, new decisionmaking
frameworks, and new policy instruments. Spurred by concerns about
cost and iatrogenic injury, medical care is shifting from a framework in
which heroic individual specialists treat particular diseases to one in
which teams of health care providers work in concert to promote overall
patient health. 13 6 Taking countervailing risks seriously, the regulatory
state should likewise progress from its current atomized focus on
particular target risks toward a teamwork, multitasking, integrated
approach which promotes overall public and environmental health.

Mar. 17, 1997, at 4B. But such a smart airbag may be costly. See supra text
accompanying notes 110-113. A dual-deployment airbag that inflates more gently in
lower-speed collisions was available on some General Motors cars in the 1970s, but is
not available today. See Robert C. Sanders, Misplaced Blame for Air Bag Debacle,
(letter), Regulation, Spr. 1997, at 3.
136 See Audy, supra note 1, at 49; Havighurst, supra note 41.

